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ABSTRACT
This paper employs survival analysis to study the duration of US imports. We find that the median
duration of exporting a product to the US is very short, on the order to two to four years. Our results
also indicate that there is negative duration dependence meaning that if a country is able to survive
in the exporting market for the first few years it will face a very small probability of failure and will
export the product for a long period of time. This result holds across countries and industries. We
find that our results are not only robust to aggregation but are strengthened by aggregation. That is,
as we aggregate from product level trade data to SITC industry level trade data the estimated
survival increases. We rank countries by their survival experience and show that our rankings are
strongly correlated with the rankings in Feenstra and Rose (2002), implying that product cycle
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Positive trade theory usually asks questions which address the “who, what, when, and why” of
international trade. One question that is not often addressed is “how long?” When countries
trade, how long do their trade relationships last? Are they exchanging products over long or
short periods of time?
In order to answer these questions we study the duration of trade relationships. To our
knowledge we are the ﬁrst to do so and several important ﬁndings emerge from our analysis.
First, we demonstrate not only that there is a remarkable amount of entry and exit in the US
import market but also that the period of time a country is “in” the market is often ﬂeeting.
We ﬁnd that some trade relationships are long-lived, by which we mean a country exports
a product for many years. We ﬁnd, however, that it is far more common to observe short-
lived trade relationships wherein a country trades a product for a few years and then stops. In
particular, more than half of all trade relationships are observed for a single year and 85 percent
are observed for fewer than ﬁve years.
Second, because our analysis is performed at a highly disaggregated (7-digit) level we show
one must carefully account for censored observations. As we explain censoring issues are more
severe when working at the product level because of reclassiﬁcations. Once we account for cen-
soring we can estimate survival and hazard rate functions of exporting to the United States. We
ﬁnd the median duration that a country exports a product to the US is very short, somewhere be-
tween two and four years depending on the censoring approach employed. Moreover, although
duration does vary by source country and region, we show that short-lived relationships charac-
terize trade by most countries. Said differently, we ﬁnd short relationships are prevalent for both
OECD and non-OECD countries although we ﬁnd systematically higher survival experience for
OECD trade relationships.
1Third, we ﬁnd that our results are not only robust to aggregation but in fact are strengthened
by aggregation. That is, as we aggregate from product level trade data to SITC industry level
trade data the estimated survival decreases. We show that this paradoxical result is related to
the unique censoring problems that are only present when the analysis is done at the product
level. As a result, it is more straightforward to conduct industry level analysis although doing
so makes it somewhat more difﬁcult to interpret what the relationship represents. It should be
noted, however, that the results across SITC aggregations are intuitive with higher aggregations
having longer durations. The aggregation exercise conﬁrms that our main ﬁnding — that trade
relationships tend to be quite short — is not an anomaly.
Fourth, our results also indicate that there is negative duration dependence, meaning that
the conditional probability of failure decreases as duration increases. Conditional on observing
a trade relationship surviving the ﬁrst ﬁve years, the hazard rate for the rest of the sample is
just 12 percent. The results suggest the presence of a type of a threshold effect where once a
relationship is established and has survived the ﬁrst few years it is likely the relationship will
survive a long time.
All things considered, the results in this paper suggest that more is happening at the micro-
level than suggested by either existing theory or empirical studies. For instance, according to
the factor proportions theory trade is based on factor endowment differences, and since such
differences change gradually trade patterns are likewise expected to evolve slowly. Unhappi-
ness with this implication spurred the development of trade models with richer trade dynamics
(Krugman, 1979; Dollar, 1990; Grossman and Helpman, 1991). In this literature Vernon’s
(1966) seminal product cycle theory is probably the best known. Vernon’s model generates a
particular pattern for trade relationships. The technological leaders develop and export a prod-
uct until others learn how to manufacture it and enter the market. As the technology becomes
more and more standardized, other countries will begin to produce and export the product. If
2these follower countries have relatively low costs, they will eventually take over the market and
push out the leaders. All of these models, however, imply a fairly predictable pattern of trade
dynamics — trade dynamics either evolve slowly or in logical progression from developed to
developing countries; none of the models suggest that short-lived trade relationships would be
the norm.1 None of the models suggest that trade relationships would be as ﬂeeting as implied
by our results.
Until relatively recently there has been little direct evidence of the product cycle.2 Gagnon
and Rose (1995) and Feenstra and Rose (2000) stand out for their use of disaggregated industry
data to look for systematic evidence of trade dynamics. The results from these papers have
different implications for trade dynamics. Gagnon and Rose study the persistence of trade
balances and obtain results that support the view that trade dynamics are gradual. They ﬁnd that
industries characterized by trade surpluses (deﬁcits) in the early-1960s were extremely likely
to also be characterized by trade surpluses (deﬁcits) 25 years later. Gagnon and Rose conclude
that “there is little evidence of dynamic patterns” in trade (p. 230).
Feenstra and Rose take a different approach toward identifying the product cycle and pro-
vide compelling support for Vernon’s hypothesis. Rather the modelling the entire product cycle
dynamics, Feenstra and Rose identify the phenomenon by focusing on a single datum: the date
that a country ﬁrst exports a product to the United States. Their work is an excellent example of
how one can gain great insight by simplifying the task at hand. Using panel data for US imports,
they ﬁnd certain countries tend to be ﬁrst to export a product while others tend to begin to export
at a later date. They also ﬁnd that the order in which countries ﬁrst export a good is consistent
with macroeconomic rankings typically associated with technological progress which further
1In Grossman and Helpman’s (1991) “quality ladder” variant of the product cycle model the leader and follower
exchange dominance of exports of a particular good over time, as leaders re-enter the market for a given good by
innovating and offering a more advanced version.
2The earlier empirical evidence in support of the product cycle was based on indirect measures (Deardorff, 1984;
Audretsch, 1987; Cotsomitis et al., 1991).
3supports Vernon’s hypothesis. Feenstra and Rose conclude that “there is strong evidence of
intuitive ordering of countries and commodities, consistent with the product cycle (p. 378).”
Our ﬁndings both challenge and complement these earlier results.3 On the one hand, we ﬁnd
that even though a trade balance perspective may indicate little or no dynamics, each competitor
(supplier) in the marketplace may perceive the market to be very ﬂuid and highly dynamic. In
addition, our approach shows that entry, whether early or late, can be associated with a highly
ephemeral trade relationship. On the other hand, our estimated survival functions do imply that
some countries systematically perform better than others. We then take the next logical step
and use our estimated survival functions to rank each country’s survival experience. We show
that our rankings are consistent with Feenstra and Rose’s rankings. In other words, our results
conﬁrm the notion that there is a product cycle and that leaders not only tend to be the ﬁrst to the
market (Feenstra and Rose) but also tend to have longer spells of service. The results suggest
that later in the product cycle products become standardized and competitive market pressures
create short-term relationships.
Thispaperpresents, tothebestofourknowledge, theﬁrstattempttoexaminetheissueofthe
duration of trade relationships. The issue is stimulated in part by the ﬁndings of Haveman and
Hummels (2001), Feenstra and Rose, and Schott (2001) who document that in any given year
and for any given product, many countries do not trade, which means there are a lot of zero trade
observations.4 While this is an important realization, none of these previous studies examined
whether a country’s current state (i.e., being “in” or “out” of the market) was a permanent
feature. We show that being in the market is often a transitory phenomenon.5
3Moenius and Riker (1999)’s ﬁndings are also related to this paper. They examine the empirical relevance of the
quality ladders model of Grossman and Helpman and conﬁrm most of the volatility implications of the model.
4Feenstra and Rose’s approach depends on the fact that many of the zero value observations become positive in
later years.
5Other research on dynamics of trade has focused on examining the evolution of patterns of industrial special-
ization over time rather than the dynamics of trade per se (Proudman and Redding, 1998; Redding, 2002).
4The paper proceeds as follows. The next section presents the data, and offers an example.
We also examine the distribution of the length of trade relationships and discuss some com-
plications such as multiples spells and censoring. Section 3 discusses modeling of duration
and presents estimation techniques. Section 4 presents estimates of survival and hazard rate
functions and discusses differences across countries and products as well as the effects of ag-
gregation. In section 5 we examine the robustness of our results. We show that our ﬁndings are
not particularly sensitive to changes in how we measure trade relationships, deﬁne failure, or
level of aggregation. In fact, we ﬁnd that the median duration is often shorter in these alternative
formulations than for our benchmark data. The most signiﬁcant changes occur when we give
greater weight to relationships with large trade values. While a weighted analysis does increase
duration, we still ﬁnd that 50 percent of trade weighted relationships are observed for fewer
than ﬁve years. In section 6 we relate our ﬁndings to Feenstra and Rose’s country rankings.
2. Data
Our analysis is based on US import statistics as compiled by Feenstra (1996).6 From 1972
through 1988 import products were classiﬁed according to the seven digit Tariff Schedule of
the United States (TS).7 Since 1989 imports have been classiﬁed according to the ten digit
Harmonized System (HS). Given that all products were recoded in 1989, we limit our analysis
to the period 1972-1988 in order to avoid potential concordance issues.8 In simplest terms, for
each commodity and year we can identify all of the countries from whom the United States
purchased. Over the entire period there is a total of about 22,000 different products in the TS
6The data is available from http://data.econ.ucdavis.edu/international/.
7We only study imports because there is no concordance between the disaggregated import and export codes. In
addition, the export data is self-reported making it more likely that exports are misreported.
8Many TS products are mapped into multiple HS codes and vice-versa making impossible to discern actual exits.
See Schott (2001) for more discussion of the TS-HS concordance problem.
5data. On average, in each year we observe import trade for about 10,000 products sourced from
about 160 countries.
Trade relationships and spells of service
We are interested in studying the length of time until a country ceases to export a product to the
US, an event that we will refer to as a “failure.” As a result calendar time is not as important
as analysis time, which measures the length of time that a country exports a product to the US.
Hence, for each product and country we use the annual data to create spell data. By this we
mean that if we observe trade in product i from country c from 1976–1980, we would say that
the cith trade relationship has a spell length of ﬁve.
Most of our analysis is based on the most disaggregated data available, 7-digit TS data,
which means our analysis is at the product level, not the industry level. Inferences are based
on trade in tangible products rather than aggregate summaries. Until relatively recently such
disaggregated data was not widely available and empirical studies were based on industry clas-
siﬁcations, such as the Standard International Trade Classiﬁcation (SITC). We chose to base our
benchmark results on the 7-digit TS data primarily because it does the best job of measuring
trade in a speciﬁed product. For instance, the TS data reports information on more than 30 dif-
ferent types of ball bearings, differentiating by specialized application (e.g., automobiles), size,
and chemistry. By contrast, if we were to perform our analysis using SITC classiﬁcations (as
we do later in our robustness checks) we would aggregate all of these ball bearing codes along
with other similar, or perhaps not so similar, products to create spells of service. For instance,
the dozens of ball bearings codes map into a single SITC category “Ball, roller or needle roller
bearings” (4 digit code=7491). Further aggregation is possible, say to “Non-electric machinery
parts” (3 digit code=749) or “Industrial machinery” (2 digit code=74), but doing so makes it
increasingly difﬁcult to interpret the results since each classiﬁcation includes highly disparate
6products.
For duration analysis we believe that using highly disaggregated data is imperative. First,
the more aggregated is the data, the more the analysis identiﬁes industry trends rather than
competitive dynamics at the product level. The fact that country c in industry j has a long
duration tells us little about the duration of commodity trade or underlying trade dynamics. For
instance, supposeweobservethreecountriesexporting“Industrialmachinery”andthat eachhas
a long trade duration. This might lead us to surmise that the dynamics among these countries are
very similar. This need not be the case. For instance, country c1 might be uniformly superior:
every product it sells could have a long duration. On the other hand, country c2 might be
a dismal failure: the success (i.e., long duration) of one product could hide a multitude of
failures (short-lived spells). Finally, country c3 could be a classic example of Vernon’s product
cycle: the observed long duration at the industry level could reﬂect a progression from simpler
products (say, ball bearings) to very complicated products (say, engines). If nothing else, the
more aggregated is the data the more cautious we should be interpreting the results; a less
muniﬁcent view might be that aggregated data makes it impossible to measure dynamics.
Second, iftheproductsaretoobroadlydeﬁned, wecannotexpecttoseeanysourcecountries
exit the data. For instance, at the extreme if we aggregate all imports from each country, we
will never observe any exit since the United States purchases some product from each source
country every year. Simply put, higher aggregations can hide a great deal of dynamics and
competition in the import market.
For each product we create a panel of countries which export the product to the US. Table 1
provides an example of what the dataset looks like for a representative product, “Milled Corn
(TS=1312000).” The “X”s in the table indicate years in which each country exports the product
to the US. As shown, there are countries that export corn every year, such as Canada and Portu-
gal. This pattern illustrates a spell of length 17 years. Another dozen or so countries have one
7spell. Mexico begins exporting corn in 1974, South Korea in 1976, and Peru in 1984, and all
three service the US market in every year after entry. The remaining countries with one spell
all export corn for just one year.
There are several countries with two spells. The United States imports corn from Venezuela
in every year but 1981. Ecuador exports corn in 1973 and 1974 (the ﬁrst spell, length 2) and
then services the US market for the second time starting in 1979 and continuing through 1988
(the second spell, length 10). The Dominican Republic also has two spells, but both of length 1.
Colombia and Italy each have three spells, both starting with two short ones (of length 3 and
1, and 1 and 2, respectively), before entering the US market for the third time (1981 and 1980,
respectively) and staying for the remainder of time. Of the remaining countries most have very
short spells, with the exception of the Netherlands whose ﬁrst spell is ﬁve years long. However,
its remaining four spells are all just one year long.
Once we think of the data in terms of spells our data set has 693,963 observations (see
Table 2). The observations have a median (mean) spell length of 1 (2.7) years. We will discuss
how aggregation affects our results in more detail in section 5, but we note here that Table 2
also includes statistics when we use the more aggregated SITC industry classiﬁcation system
to construct trade relationships.9 We have 157,850 observations when we use the 5-digit SITC
classiﬁcation, 90,035 observations when we use the 4-digit level and just 2,484 observations at
the 1-digit level. As expected, when we aggregate the data our ability to observe entry and exit
diminishes and the mean spell length increases, from 2.7 years in the TS data to 3.9 years in the
5-digit SITC data to 8.4 years in the 1-digit SITC data.
In Figure 1 we plot the distribution for each observed spell length. On the x-axis we plot
the observed spell length. On the y-axis we plot the percentage of observations whose observed
spell of service is greater than a given length. In the benchmark 7-digit TS data, more than half
9SITC imports are also reported in Feenstra (1996).
8of all spells are just one year long. About 70 percent of the spells are observed for two or fewer
years. About 80 percent of the spells are observed for three or fewer years. On the opposite
side of the spectrum less than two percent of all spells are observed for all 17 years. Simply
put, there is a plethora of short spells. In Figure 1 we also plot the distribution for alternative
measures of trade relationships; these other distributions will be discussed later in the paper.
Multiple spells
Looking at Table 1, one sees that some trade relationships re-occur or have multiple spells of
service. That is, a country will service the market, exit, then re-enter the market, and then
almost always exit again. As it turns out, about a quarter of trade relationships experience
multiple spells of service. About two-thirds of those trade relationships with multiple spells
experience just two spells; less than one percent of trade relationships with multiple spells have
more than three spells. All told we have 495,763 trade relationships as compared with 693,963
spells of service.
We will begin by treating multiple spells as independent. While this assumption is made
primarily in the interest of simplicity in section 5 we explore alternatives and ﬁnd our results
are likely not overly sensitive to this assumption. To get a sense of why this is the case, it is
instructivetolookatthedistributionofspellswhenweexcludemultiplespells. Firstlet’srestrict
the analysis to those trade relationships with just a single spell. As reported in Table 2, these
observations have a median (mean) spell length of 1 (3.2) years; thus, the median is exactly
the same as the benchmark data (all 7-digit TS observations) and the mean is just a half a year
longer. In Figure 1 we show the entire distribution. In both cases we see that more than half of
all spells are just one year long and about 75 percent of the spells are observed for fewer than
four years; further, in both distributions only about 5 percent of the spells are observed for 10
or more years.
9Alternatively, we can restrict the analysis to just the ﬁrst spell of a trade relationships. This
alternative includes those relationships with just a single spell and also the ﬁrst spell of those
relationships with multiple service spells. As was the case in the ﬁrst comparison, the distribu-
tion is very similar to the benchmark. This similarity among these distributions suggests that
the independence assumption is a reasonable starting place.
Censoring
Once we begin to think of the data in terms of spells it becomes apparent that we need to
account for censoring in our analysis. By this we mean that we often do not know whether a
trade relationship ends because of failure or for some other reason. In practice this means that
we are uncertain about the beginning and/or ending date for some trade relationships.
As it turns out, censoring is pretty common in US import data — about half of the trade
observations are censored and about 20 percent of spells are censored at one year. The censoring
problem comes in two ﬂavors. First, we have no information on trade relationships for the years
before the beginning (pre-1972) and after the end of our sample (post-1988). As seen in Table 1
we observe that the US imported corn from the Philippines in 1972 and that this relationship
was observed for exactly one year. This trade relationship may have begun in 1972 or it may
have begun in some prior year. The most appropriate interpretation is that this relationship had
a duration of at least one year. Similarly, we also observe that the US imported corn from Peru
from1984to1988. Unfortunately, ourdatadoesnotcontinuebeyond1988andhencewecannot
be sure how long that spell ultimately lasted. Once again, the most appropriate interpretation
is that this relationship had a duration of at least ﬁve years. About 10 percent of spells are
observed in 1972, while about 22 percent are observed in 1988.10 This ﬁrst type of censoring is
typical in survival studies and is incorporated in all of our subsequent analysis.
10Remember, less than two percent of all spells are observed both in 1972 and 1988.
10The second type of censoring is somewhat unique and stems from the fact that our analysis
is done at the product level. US Customs revises product deﬁnitions for the tariff codes on an
ongoing basis, sometimes splitting a single code into multiple codes and other times combining
multiple codes into fewer codes. Unfortunately, information does not exist to allow us to map
the old TS codes into the new TS codes. When a code is changed we no longer observe trade
in the old product code. But, is this due to the end of a relationship or does it simply mean
that trade stopped due to the redeﬁnition? Throughout much of our analysis we choose to be
cautious and classify all such “exits” as censored, which means that we interpret reclassiﬁed
relationships as having duration of at least x years (where x is the number of years where trade
in the original code was observed).
An analogous problem exists for the new codes. When a code is changed we begin to
observe trade in the new product code. But, is this really the beginning of a new relationship
or does it simply reﬂect the redeﬁnition? Once again for much of our analysis we choose to be
cautious and assume the relationship had a duration of at least y years (where y is the number
of years where trade in the new code was observed). About 20 percent of the spells are censored
duetoreclassiﬁcation. Thissecondtypeofcensoringisapeculiarcharacteristicofourparticular
application; it is incorporated into what we refer to as our benchmark estimates.
The issue is that our decision to interpret all product code changes as being censored is very
conservative — certainly some of the new codes were truly measuring new products and some
of the obsolete codes were measuring products that were no longer traded. In other words, in
our benchmark data we have probably classiﬁed some spells as being censored when they were
truly associated with either an entry or an exit. If more information were available we would
be able to identify such births and deaths.11 Unfortunately, this additional information does
11Xiang (2002) uses the changes in the verbal description of 4-digit SIC industry codes to identify new prod-
ucts. Even using relatively aggregated industry data (about 450 industries) Xiang describes a time-consuming and
painstaking process.
11not exist. This means that our benchmark results will overstate the true duration of the typical
trading relationship.
An alternative that we explore is to classify these product code changes as indicating entry
and exit. It should be noted, however, that this alternative classiﬁcation scheme will undoubt-
edly understate the true duration. As a result, the “true” duration will lie somewhere between
these two approaches toward censoring.
3. Modeling Duration
Duration models
Let T denote the time to a failure event. Since time in our analysis is discrete we assume T is a
discrete random variable taking on values ti, i = 1,2,...,n with probability density function
p(ti) = Pr(T = ti), i = 1,2,...,n where t1 < t2 < ··· < tn. The survival function for a
random variable T is given by




The hazard function is
h(ti) = Pr(T = ti | T ≥ ti) =
p(ti)
S(ti−1)
, i = 1,2,...,n






12Keifer (1988) provides a good survey of duration models, while Hosmer and Lemeshow (1998), Lancaster
(1990), and Lee (1992) provide good introductions to survival analysis.
12Nonparametric estimation
The two functions of interest in this paper are the survivor and hazard functions. To estimate
them we will assume we have n independent observations denoted (ti,ci), i = 1,2,...,n,
where ti is the survival time and ci is the censoring indicator variable C (taking on a value of
1 if failure occurred, 0 otherwise) of observation i. Assume there are m ≤ n recorded times
of failure. Denote the rank-ordered survival times as t(1) < t(2) < ... < t(m). Let ni denote the
number of subjects at risk of failing at t(i) and let di denote the number of observed failures.







with the convention that  S(t) = 1i ft < t(1). The Kaplan-Meier estimator is robust to censoring
and uses information from both censored and non-censored observations. The standard error of
the Kaplan-Meier estimator is given by Greenwood’s formula

















The hazard function is estimated by taking the ratio of subjects who die in a given year to







We begin by examining the benchmark 7-digit TS data dataset. In Table 3 we report the distribu-
tion of the Kaplan-Meier estimated survival time. Begin by looking under the columns labelled
“TS7-benchmark.” The row “Total” shows the overall distribution of survival time. The other
rows report the Kaplan-Meier estimates for particular regions and industries.
First note the difference between Kaplan-Meier estimated survival time and the spell lengths
reported in Table 2: the Kaplan-Meier estimates are signiﬁcantly longer. The difference, of
course, is that the Kaplan-Meier estimator accounts for censoring while the spell lengths re-
ported in Table 2 do not; this comparison highlights the importance of accounting for censoring
when working with product level data.
The second important ﬁnding involves how sharply the risk of failure falls. The analysis
indicates that the risk of failure is quite high in the early years, but then rapidly falls once a trade
relationship survives a threshold duration. The 25th percentile of the distribution is one year,
whichmeansthataftertheﬁrstyear, morethan25percentofthespellsfail. Themedianduration
is just four years, indicating that a considerable number of observations fail over the following
three years. After about four or ﬁve years, however, failure becomes a lot less common: the
75th percentile spans the whole data set (which we denoted by a period). In other words, more
than 50 percent of the observations fail within the ﬁrst four years, but over the next 13 years
less than one quarter of the observations fail. This suggests that countries exporting to the US
face a large conditional probability of failure in the early stages of their trade relationship and a
much smaller conditional probability once they have survived a few years.
The estimated overall survival function,  S(t) is graphed in Figure 2 together with the 95%
conﬁdence interval. The conﬁdence interval is very tight (imperceptible), which is not sur-
14prising given the size of the data set used. The survival function is downward sloping with
a decreasing slope. The estimated survival function suggests that the hazard rate should be a
decreasing function and this is conﬁrmed in Figure 3 where we present the estimated hazard
function. As shown, the probability of failing in the ﬁrst year is 33 percent. The hazard rate
between year one and ﬁve is an additional 30 percent. The hazard rate for the remaining twelve
years is just 12 percent.
Figures 2 and 3 indicate that after a large decrease in the probability of survival over the ﬁrst
few years, the survival function levels off and decreases very little. Both the survival and haz-
ard functions indicate that there is negative duration dependence, meaning that the conditional
probability of failure decreases as duration increases. This result indicates the presence of a
type of a threshold effect. In other words, it appears that once a relationship is established and
has survived the ﬁrst few years it is likely the relationship will survive a long time. This ﬁnding
is similar to that documented by Pakes and Ericson (1998) for retail trade establishments.13
It is somewhat surprising that the Kaplan-Meier estimate of probability of exporting a prod-
uct for more than 17 years is so high (0.41) given that we previously showed that less than two
percent of all trade relationships span the entire sample (Figure 1). These seemingly inconsis-
tent ﬁndings are explained by the prevalence of censoring when using the product level data.
Many of the relationships that are observed to end are censored and thus in our benchmark
results we do not classify them as failures.
The impact of censoring due to product codes changes can be identiﬁed if we estimate the
Kaplan-Meier survival function using the modiﬁed censoring approach discussed above. Under
this alternative scheme we consider all changes in TS codes as indicating births and deaths
which means we will observe much more entry and exit in the data. We report the results
13Pakes and Ericson interpret their results as supporting Jovanovic’s (1982) theory of learning.
15in Table 2 and Figure 4.14 In Table 3 we see that under this modiﬁed censoring scheme the
median duration falls to just two years as compared with four years in the benchmark data; the
75th percentile is just six years under modiﬁed censoring. In other words, at least 75 percent
of the spells fail within six years. In Figure 4 we depict the Kaplan-Meier survival function
for both the benchmark 7-digit TS data and for the modiﬁed censoring data. As expected, the
hazard rate is substantially higher during the ﬁrst years under modiﬁed censoring; by year four
the survival rate is about 20 percentage points smaller under the modiﬁed censoring scheme.15
Nevertheless, as was the case with the benchmark data, the hazard rate falls sharply after about
four or ﬁve years and there is little additional failure. Overall, we ﬁnd that the probability of
exporting a product for more than 17 years under modiﬁed censoring is only 0.18 — less than
half of that of the benchmark data — but still considerably higher than the observed two percent
of trade relationships that span the entire sample.
Region and industry survival functions
In Table 3 we also report statistics broken out by individual regions and industries for both the
benchmark and modiﬁed censoring data. For all regions we observe that a substantial fraction
of trade relationships quickly end in failure: the 25th percentile of the distribution is one to
two years for all regions. There are differences across regions in the severity of the initial
wave of failures with Northern regions tending to outperform Southern regions. When using
the benchmark data we ﬁnd that the Northern regions (as represented by Canada, Asia, and
Western Europe) have a median duration of at least six years; of this set, Canada has by far the
longest median survival time, which spans the whole data set. In other words, less than half of
14Recall that in this modiﬁed scheme products traded in 1972 or 1988 are still classiﬁed as censored.
15As we showed previously, there is a connection between the hazard function and the survival function: when
the probability of survival decreases signiﬁcantly the hazard rate is large; when the probability of survival decreases
slightly the hazard rate is small.
16the observations on Canadian trade end in failure within the our 17 year sample.
Quite a different story emerges for the Southern regions. Using the benchmark data, the
Southern regions have a median duration of no more than two years — half of all trade rela-
tionships from these regions will fail within two years.16 We also point out that the difference
between Northern and Southern regions is also observed under the modiﬁed censoring scheme,
where once again the Northern regions have uniformly higher median survival times.
In Figure 5 we use the benchmark data and estimate the survival functions for individual
regions. As one can see the shapes of the survival functions are similar and all reﬂect the basic
dynamics described above. For each region there is a signiﬁcant probability of failure in the ﬁrst
four or ﬁve years of the relationship, but thereafter the hazard falls substantially. Nevertheless,
survival varies substantially across source region. In the case of Canada about 60 percent of
trade relationships survive 10 or more years. By contrast, in the case of Africa only 20 percent
of trade relationships survive 10 or more years.
The results clearly suggest that duration can broadly be thought of as a North versus South
story, with Northern sources having longer median survival times. This insight can be drawn
more sharply by estimating the Kaplan-Meier survival functions for OECD and non-OECD
countries separately. We present the results in Figure 6. On average, the estimated survival
for OECD countries is about 10 percentage points higher than for non-OECD countries. Thus
while the survival pattern is qualitatively similar across regions, Northern countries clearly fare
better.
When we look at survival functions by industry we again see broadly similar trends — a
waveofinitialfailureswhicharefollowedbyasigniﬁcantdecreaseinhazard. AsseeninTable3
and depicted in Figure 7 the 25th percentile of the distribution is one year for every industry.
16The category “Other” contains the following countries that we did not assign to any region: Bermuda, Green-
land, St. Pierre Miquelon, and Unknown Partner.
17Looking at the benchmark data, with the exception of two industries the median survival time
is three years or less. In other words, in most industries more than half of all observations fail
within two years.
In two key industries, Machinery (SITC 7) and Miscellaneous Manufactures (SITC 8), the
estimated duration is far longer, more than 11 years. An explanation for the distinct difference
between these two industries and the others lies at least in part to the apparently high prevalence
of product reclassiﬁcation censoring that occurs in these two industries. Evidence of this can be
found when we look at the distribution under our modiﬁed censoring scheme where we observe
that these two industries have a median survival time of two years, the same as all but one
industry(whosemediansurvivaltimeisoneyear). Thehigherthanaverageincidenceofproduct
codes changes might reﬂect that these two industries are characterized by the most innovation
and shortest product cycles; a dynamism which results in numerous TS codes changes. If
this is the case, then the modiﬁed censoring scheme probably does a better job capturing the
actual dynamics as the code changes probably reﬂect true entry and exit (i.e., births and deaths).
On the other hand, the high incidence of code changes might reﬂect other factors that are not
associated with economically meaningful entry and exit. For instance, the code changes might
simply be a way to mitigate the impact of GATT negotiated tariff reductions or expand the scope
of the Multiﬁbre Agreement. In this case, the benchmark censoring scheme is probably more
appropriate, implying that these two industries really are outliers. A resolution of this issue is
beyond the scope of this paper but certainly merits further analysis.
5. Robustness of results
Theresultsindicatethattraderelationshipsarequiteshort: estimatedmediansurvivalisbetween
two and four years. We now examine whether our ﬁndings are robust to how we measure trade
18relationships and spells.
Aggregation concerns — SITC level analysis
We begin by exploring whether our ﬁnding is possibly due to the highly disaggregated nature
of our data. Perhaps 30 different ball-bearing codes represents an overly ﬁne parsing of the data
that leads us to observe excessive entry and exit.17 If so, a trade relationship might be better
measured using SITC industry classiﬁcations.
To address this concern we also calculated spells of service using SITC industry (revision 2)
deﬁnitions ranging from the 1-digit to the 5-digit level. As mentioned above, summary statistics
for the SITC classiﬁcations are given in Table 2 where we show that the median observed spell
length is two or fewer years in the 1-digit SITC through the 4-digit SITC data. The distribution
of duration time based on the Kaplan-Meier estimates are presented in Table 3; the estimates
themselves are depicted in Figure 4.
A number of interesting insights are gained by examining trade relationship using industry-
leveldata. First, notethatwithintheSITCclassiﬁcationsaggregationworksexactlyasexpected.
Higher levels of aggregation are associated with longer survival times. As depicted in Figure 4
thesurvivalfunctionforthe4-digitSITCliesabovethe5-digitSITC,the3-digitSITCliesabove
the 4-digit SITC, and so on. Nevertheless, although aggregation creates longer survival times
the estimated survival times remain remarkably brief. There remains a large number of short
spells of service until the data is fairly highly aggregated. In particular, as shown in Table 3, the
median survival time is two years for the 3-digit, 4-digit, and 5-digit SITC data.
Second, in comparison with the median survival time for the 7-digit TS benchmark data the
brevity of duration times for the SITC data is somewhat surprising. Speciﬁcally, despite the
17It is not obvious that the TS classiﬁcation system is too ﬁne. To the contrary, Schott (2000) presents evidence
that the TS categories may be too broad.
19higher degree of aggregation the 2-digit through 5-digit SITC data all have a shorter median
survival time than the benchmark 7-digit TS data. As depicted in Figure 4 only the 1-digit SITC
data has a higher survival function than the 7-digit TS benchmark.
This result seemingly implies that aggregation from products to industries lowers survival.
Taken at face value, this is an odd result. This unusual ﬁnding, however, has a completely
logical explanation. The SITC classiﬁcation system (revision 2) is unchanged throughout our
sample. As a result only the ﬁrst type of censoring (which is driven by the beginning and
end of our sample) is present in the SITC analysis. In other words, it is more appropriate
to compare results based on the SITC classiﬁcations with the 7-digit TS modiﬁed censoring
data. As shown in Figure 4 when we do that comparison we get the expected result: survival
experience for product level data is lower than for the 5-digit SITC industry level data and
aggregation increases estimated survival time.
In effect, the SITC data shows that both approaches toward handling censoring in the 7-digit
TS data are imperfect. In an ideal world we would be able to truly identify all births, deaths, and
censored product changes. But, since we cannot do so we are left with two imperfect measures:
(i) the 7-digit TS benchmark data which overstate the “true” survival experience (since all prod-
uct code changes are censored) and (ii) the modiﬁed censoring data which understate the “true”
survival experience (since all product code changes are interpreted as births and deaths).
Moreover, given that survival experience at the product-based level must be shorter than at
the 5-digit SITC industry level, the results shown in Figure 4 indicate that the true 7-digit TS
survival experience indeed lies between our two measures. In effect, the SITC results imply that
the “true” median survival experience at the 7-digit TS level is two to four years and probably
is closer to two years. In either case, the evidence is clear: duration is very brief.
20Multiple Spells
As mentioned, about a quarter of trade relationships experience multiple spells of service. In
the above analysis we have assumed that duration is independent of spell number. We now
investigate whether this assumption biases our ﬁndings.
To check the sensitivity of our results, we considered several alternative approaches toward
the issueof multiple spells. First, we simply limited our analysis to only those relationships with
a single spell. In Figure 1 we plotted the distribution for trade relationships with a single spell.
And as discussed above there is very little difference between the distributions for single spell
and all 7-digit TS data — under this alternative formulation about half the observations have a
spell length of just one year and more than 75 percent of the spells last three or fewer years. The
Kaplan-Meier estimated survival function for the single spell data is depicted in Figure 8. The
survival function for the single spell data has a similar pattern as the benchmark data, namely
high hazard in the ﬁrst few years followed by a levelling off of the survival function. Overall,
however, the single spell data exhibits signiﬁcantly higher survival: about 21 percentage points
higher than the benchmark data in year 17.
The similarity of spell length distributions (Figure 1) sharply contrasts with the differences
in the Kaplan-Meier estimates (Figure 8). This suggests that the censoring approach taken in
the benchmark data plays a role. Speciﬁcally, censoring is more common in the single spell
data which shifts up the Kaplan-Meier estimates. Moreover, as we discussed in the preceding
section, analysisbasedontheSITCdataindicatesthatthebenchmarkdataoverstatestheamount
of censoring in the data and that the modiﬁed censoring approach may yield a more appropriate
measure of true survival experience. To get a sense of the magnitude we re-estimate the single
spell data using the modiﬁed censoring approach and present the Kaplan-Meier estimates in
Figure 8. As shown, the median survival time is now 3 years as compared with 2 years when
21all observations are included. While the single spell data has a higher survival experience, the
effect is not as great as in the benchmark approach: about 7 percentage points higher than the
benchmark data in year 17.
A second approach we explored was to limit the analysis to only ﬁrst spells. This alternative
includes those relationships with just a single spell and also the ﬁrst spell of those relationships
with multiple service spells. Since the results are generally similar to the single spell results
they will not be explicitly discussed.
Another way we addressed the issue of multiple spells was to consider the possibility that
some of the reported multiple spells are due to measurement error. Speciﬁcally, if the time
between spells is short, it may be that the gap is mis-measured and that interpreting the initial
spell as “failing” is inappropriate. In this case, it may be more appropriate to interpret the
two spells as one longer spell. To allow for such misreporting, we assume that a one-year gap
between spells is an error, and hence merge the individual spells and adjust the duration length
accordingly. Gaps of two or more years are assumed to be accurate and no merging is done.
The spell length distribution for this gap-adjusted data is depicted in Figure 1. As seen
this adjusting for this potential type of measurement error shifts the distribution but short spells
remain the norm. In Table 2 we report the summary statistics for the gap-adjusted data. In
comparison with the benchmark 7-digit TS data, the average spell length is longer by about a
half year.
The Kaplan-Meier estimated survival function for the gap-adjusted data is depicted in Fig-
ure 8. As expected, the survival function exhibits less early failure and more failure in later
times. For example, after two years the survival function for the benchmark data is 0.57 as
compared with 0.66 in the gap-adjusted data. By contrast, the hazard rate for the last twelve
years is just 12 percent in the benchmark data but 14 percent in the gap-adjusted data. As was
the case with the single spell and ﬁrst spell alternatives we ﬁnd that using the modiﬁed censoring
22approach reduces the difference between the gap-adjusted and 7-digit TS data.
Taken together, these results suggest that the independence assumption likely leads to an
under-estimate of duration although our analysis indicates that the magnitude of the bias is
fairly small for most scenarios. In particular, if one believes the modiﬁed censoring approach
best captures the true survival experience, the independence assumption does not appear to have
a signiﬁcant impact under any of these scenarios.
Trade Weighted Analysis
Theﬁnalissueweexploreinvolvesputtingmoreweightonthehighervaluedtraderelationships.
Our benchmark dataset — and in fact all of the preceding analysis — is unweighted. Small and
large trade value relationships receive the same weight. If short spells involve small values
and long spells involve large values, an unweighted distribution might overstate the brevity of
spells. To examine this issue, we also compute a weighted distribution where each observation
is weighed by the value of trade in the ﬁrst year of the relationship. This alternative formulation
de-emphasizes the low-value spells and gives more importance to the high-value spells.
In Figure 1 we plot the spell length distribution under this weighted alternative. Comparing
it with the benchmark data we observe a signiﬁcant shift in the distribution, far greater than any
of the other alternatives. In the benchmark data, more than half the observations are observed
for just a single year. In the weighted analysis, only about 15 percent of the data is observed for
a single year This clearly suggests that lower value trade relationships tend to be shorted lived.
Nevertheless, even under the weighted scheme there remain a surfeit of short spells — more
than 50 percent of the spells are observed for four or fewer years.
In Figure 8 we present the Kaplan-Meier estimated survival function for the weighted 7-
digit TS data. The impact on survival is far greater than under any of the alternatives previously
considered. In particular, the impact on duration is more signiﬁcant than aggregating to the
231-digit industry level or restricting ourselves to single spell relationships.
6. Duration and the product cycle
Feenstra and Rose (2000) rank countries according to the ﬁrst year they export a product to the
US. They ﬁnd that the order in which countries ﬁrst export a product to the US is consistent
with macroeconomic rankings typically associated with technological progress. In other words,
they ﬁnd that the rankings are consistent with the product cycle.
We use duration methodology to compute country rankings. In other words, rather than
base the rankings on the ﬁrst year of export, we rank countries on their survival experience. In
what follows, we report countries ranked according to the probability of exporting a product for
more than four years ( S(4)). We note, however, that given that the estimated survival functions
rarely cross, the country rankings are not sensitive to what spell length we use.18 In Table 4 we
report countries rank using the 7-digit TS benchmark data, the 7-digit TS modiﬁed censoring
data, and also the 5-digit SITC industry classiﬁcation. We also reproduce the rankings reported
by Feenstra and Rose.
Therankingsbasedonestimatedsurvivalaresimilarforalldeﬁnitionsoftraderelationships.
As reported in Table 5 the pairwise correlations are about 0.90. Nevertheless, there are a couple
of anomalies in the rankings based on the 7-digit TS benchmark data. Most notably, Macao has
the 10th best survival experience, far higher than for our other two survival rankings or Feenstra
and Rose. Sri Lanka, Indonesia, and Haiti are also ranked implausibly high. Trade from each
of these countries appears to experience a high incidence of product code reclassiﬁcations as
their rankings drop sharply under the other survival calculations. These results provide further
evidence that censoring is a signiﬁcant hurdle for analysis at the product level.
18The rankings would be virtually the same if we ranked the estimated survival functions in any year.
24Overall, the results based on survival experience are quite supportive of those found by
Feenstra and Rose. As seen in Table 5 the pairwise rank correlations between the two rankings
from Feenstra and Rose (2000), goods and country based, and the rankings based on survival
are high. The highest correlation is between Feenstra and Rose’s ranking our ranking based on
the 5-digit SITC data. This is likely due to the fact that their analysis is also performed at the
5-digit SITC level. Both rankings based on the 7-digit TS data are slightly less correlated with
Feenstra and Rose and of the two, the benchmark data is somewhat more highly correlated.
An interesting lesson can be learned by having both Feenstra and Rose and our rankings.
Feenstra and Rose show that developed countries tend to be the ﬁrst in the market. Our results
show that these same countries tend to successfully sell their products for a much longer dura-
tion than do the followers. Taken together, these results highlight an often overlooked value to
being a leader. Namely, as a unique product becomes standardized and production moves to the
South, competition among the followers is often ﬁerce. As a result, exports in one year are no
guarantee of further sales.
7. Conclusion
The type of highly dynamic trade patterns evidenced in this paper are unanticipated given im-
plications from standard theoretical models and existing empirical work. Our results indicate
that typical trade relationships are more fragile than previously thought — or at least, than has
been previously discussed in the literature. In particular, we have never seen a discussion that
trade relationships may systematically last only a year or two.
This paper is the ﬁrst one to ask the question of how long trade relationships last. The sur-
prising ﬁndings shed light on entry and exit in foreign markets. The results of this paper are not
important just for the understanding of dynamics of international trade, but are also important
25for policy makers. Different policies can have important impacts on trade relationships, from
creating them to extending them to ending them. The length of trade relationships adds another
dimension to what policy makers must pay attention to.
The results indicate that most trade relationships are very short. We also show that the
phenomena are not driven by the highly disaggregated nature of the data set. Aggregating the
data results in signiﬁcantly longer durations only at very high aggregation levels. While the
actual duration increases with aggregation, the relative survival experience of countries and
industries is not affected by aggregation. There is evidence that the product cycle theory can
explain at least some features of the duration of trade as the countries with longest survival
times are those who are conventionally deﬁned as technological leaders.
Future work should focus on identifying and discriminating among potential explanations.
The product cycle is a reasonable starting point but there are others. Insights and lessons from
industrial organization literature are likely to be helpful. For instance, Ericson and Pakes (1995,
1998) develop a dynamic model of market entry and exit with some implications which are
observed in this paper. They show that ﬁrms are more likely to die in the early years of their
lives than later on, a ﬁnding we show is true for import trade relationships.19 Alternatively, our
ﬁndings could be consistent with a search model where the domestic buyers are searching for
the best partners in other countries.
19Another potentially interesting starting point is the model developed by Asplund and Nocke (2003).
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Figure 2 - Survival Function with 95% Confidence Interval


















Figure 3 - Overall Hazard Function































Figure 4 - Survival Functions for TS and SITC Based Data,
                              with Modified Censoring
7-digit TSUSA













































































Figure 6 - Survival Functions for OECD and Non-OECD Countries
7-digit TSUSA 1972-1989
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Figure 8 - Survival Functions for Alternative Treatments of 
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East Germany X 11
Venezuela XXXXXXXXX XXXXXXX16 2
Ecuador X X XXXXXXXXXX12 2
Japan X X X X 42
Argentina X X X 32
Guatemala X X 22
Dominican Rp X X 22
India X X 22
China X X 22
Colombia X X X X X X XXXXXX12 3
Italy X X X X X X XXXXXX12 3
United Kingdom X X X X X 53
Thailand X X X X 43
Taiwan X X X 33
Germany X X X 33
El Salvador X X X 33
France X X X X X 54
Netherlands XXXXX X X X X 95
Brazil X X X X X X X 75Table 2 - Summary Statistics
 Total  Number
 Mean Median of  Observations
Benchmark data
TS7 2.7 1 693,963
Industry-level aggregation
SITC5 3.9 1 157,441
SITC4 4.2 2 98,035
SITC3 4.7 2 43,480
SITC2 5.5 2 15,257
SITC1 8.4 5 2,445
TS7 Alternatives
TS7 - Trade Weighted 6.1 4 693,963
TS7 - First Spell 2.9 1 495,763
TS7 - One Spell Only 3.2 1 365,491
TS7 - Gap Adjusted 3.3 2 593,450
Spell Length (years)
ObservedTable 3 - Distribution of Kaplan-Meier estimated survival time
Product Level Data
Percentiles of distribution 25% 50% 75% 25% 50% 75%
Total 14. 126
Regions
Canada 2 . . 1 3  . 
Asia 1 9 . 1 2 7
Western Europe 1 6 . 1 2 9
South America 1 2 . 1 1 4
Eastern Europe 1 2 . 1 1 3
Oceania 1 2 . 1 1 4
Africa 1 2 6 1 1 2
Middle East 1 2 . 1 1 3
Other 1 1 2 1 1 1
SITC (rev 2) 1-digit industries
0-Food 1 2 . 1 2 6
1-Beverages/Tobacco 1 3 . 1 2 6
2-Crude Materials 1 2 9 1 2 5
3-Mineral Fuels 1 2 . 1 2 6
4-Animal and Vegetable Oils 1 2 7 1 1 4
5-Chemicals 1 3 . 1 2 7
6-Manufactured Materials 1 3 . 1 2 6
7-Machinery 1 . . 1 2 8
8-Miscellaneous Manufactures 1 11 . 1 2 5
9-Other 1 2 . 1 2 .
TS7-benchmark TS7-mod. censoringTable 3 - Distribution of Kaplan-Meier estimated survival time
Industry-level Aggregation
Percentiles of distribution 25% 50% 75% 25% 50% 75% 25% 50% 75% 25% 50% 75% 25% 50% 75%
Total 12. 12. 12. 13. 2..
Regions
Canada 10   .  . .   .    .   .   .   .   .      .     .    .    .    .  
Asia 1 2 . 1 3   .  1 3  .  1 7   .   2  .    .  
Western Europe 1 4 . 1 8   .  1  .   .  2   .     .    .    .    .  
South America 1 2 8 1 2 13 1 2  .  1 4   .   2  .    .  
Eastern Europe 1 2 5 1 2 8 1 3  .  1   .     .   13  .    .  
Oceania 1 2 . 1 2   .  1 2  .  1 3   .   2  .    .  
Africa 1 1 3 1 1 4 1 2 6 1 2   .   1 7  .  
Middle East 1 1 4 1 1 4 1 1 4 1 2   .   1  .    .  
Other 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 2 1 1 3 1 8  .  
SITC (rev 2) 1-digit industries
0-Food 1 2  .  1 2  .  1 2  . 1 4   .   2  .     . 
1-Beverages/Tobacco 1 2  .  1 2  .  1 2  . 1 4   .   1 8   . 
2-Crude Materials 1 2 10 1 2  .  1 2  . 1 3   .   3  .     . 
3-Mineral Fuels 1 2 8 1 2 10 1 2  . 1 2   .   1 3   . 
4-Animal and Vegetable Oils 1 2 6 1 2 7 1 2  . 1 2   .   1 3   . 
5-Chemicals 1 2  .  1 2  .  1 2  . 1 3   .   1  .     . 
6-Manufactured Materials 1 2  .  1 2  .  1 2  . 1 4   .   5  .     . 
7-Machinery 1 2  .  1 2  .  1 2  . 1 3   .   2  .     . 
8-Miscellaneous Manufactures 1 2  .  1 3  .  1 3  . 1 5   .    .     .     . 
9-Other 1 3  .  1 6  .  1 6  . 1 6   .    .     .     . 
SITC1 SITC5 SITC4 SITC3 SITC2Table 4 - Country rankings
Kaplan-Meier Survival
Country TS7 TS7 - Mod. Censoring SITC 5 digit Goods Based Country Based
Japan 1 3 4 4 4
Germany 2 1 2 3 3
Canada 3 2 1 1 1
United Kingdom 4 4 3 2 2
Italy 5 6 6 8 6
Taiwan 6 7 9 13 13
France 7 5 5 5 5
Hong Kong 8 9 16 17 14
South Korea 9 8 13 18 20
Macao 10 62 43 71 70
China 11 13 15 11 25
Switzerland 12 10 10 10 10
Sri Lanka 13 63 52 73 73
Mexico 14 11 8 6 7
Indonesia 15 43 34 46 52
Spain 16 15 14 14 12
Philippines 17 27 29 33 31
Thailand 18 23 25 32 34
Sweden 19 12 12 12 11
Singapore 20 29 28 28 30
Austria 21 19 17 20 17
Haiti 22 55 42 61 39
Portugal 23 25 26 34 24
Netherlands 24 14 7 7 8
Malaysia 25 39 36 39 41
India 26 22 23 24 19
Dominican Rp 27 46 40 38 37
Brazil 28 18 19 15 16
Israel 29 20 20 22 21
Denmark 30 16 18 19 15
Belgium-Lux. 31 17 11 9 9
Mauritius 32 56 47 70 110
Costa Rica 33 68 50 49 54
Turkey 34 32 31 47 50
Falkland Isl 35 69 117 149 150
Poland 36 38 33 37 32
Bangladesh 37 49 91 107 90
Fm Yugoslavia 38 34 30 40 33
Ireland 39 30 22 25 23
Finland 40 31 24 26 26
Romania 41 79 58 50 45
Australia 42 21 21 16 18
Pakistan 43 41 44 57 48
Norway 44 24 27 23 22
Morocco 45 66 45 62 62
Greece 46 50 38 43 35
Nepal 47 105 82 110 89
Guatemala 48 54 51 52 47
Colombia 49 37 35 36 29
Jamaica 50 47 56 51 44
Uruguay 51 73 64 69 65
Hungary 52 52 41 45 49
Feenstra-RoseTable 4 - Country rankings
Kaplan-Meier Survival
Country TS7 TS7 - Mod. Censoring SITC 5 digit Goods Based Country Based
Feenstra-Rose
Ecuador 53 57 57 54 56
Cyprus 54 114 65 87 83
Lebanon 55 28 32 78 59
Barbados 56 109 86 84 72
Honduras 57 53 62 60 64
Chile 58 26 48 35 57
Argentina 59 33 39 27 28
Peru 60 67 55 44 46
El Salvador 61 98 63 67 55
New Zealand 62 44 37 31 36
Egypt 63 36 59 56 75
Bolivia 64 83 66 88 77
Czechoslovakia 65 45 54 41 43
Venezuela 66 35 49 30 38
Guyana 67 93 88 82 78
South Africa 68 87 46 21 27
Algeria 69 59 105 101 104
Nicaragua 70 94 71 86 58
Trinidad-Tobago 71 64 72 59 63
Belize 72 81 93 95 92
Tunisia 73 122 84 102 99
Panama 74 90 73 53 53
Reunion 75 75 126 123 148
Zimbabwe 76 51 53 91 123
St Kitts Nev 77 92 70 48 69
Malta 78 121 78 112 71
Bahrain 79 88 121 94 131
Paraguay 80 76 79 114 82
Iceland 81 89 95 68 74
Untd Arab Em 82 70 122 74 98
Afghanistan 83 141 83 111 76
Cote D'Ivoire 84 71 61 72 102
Oman 85 142 135 118 128
Fiji 86 58 74 105 111
Cambodia 87 125 129 148 144
Kenya 88 86 60 64 67
Malawi 89 60 80 136 135
Ghana 90 61 81 97 80
Congo 91 48 76 120 120
Bahamas 92 95 98 65 61
Untd Rp Tanzania 93 40 69 124 88
Angola 94 78 111 133 109
Albania 95 77 109 108 124
St Pierre Miqu 96 74 92 135 142
Zaire 97 42 75 106 103
Fm USSR 98 84 68 29 42
Madagascar 99 65 67 117 106
Seychelles 100 85 77 99 133
Ethiopia 101 72 102 146 97
Bulgaria 102 116 103 66 86
Neth Antilles 103 107 116 63 66
East Germany 104 108 89 42 40Table 4 - Country rankings
Kaplan-Meier Survival
Country TS7 TS7 - Mod. Censoring SITC 5 digit Goods Based Country Based
Feenstra-Rose
Guinea 105 100 104 92 140
Iraq 106 82 113 139 96
Sierra Leone 107 91 108 116 117
Djibouti 108 112 133 150 149
Cameroon 109 103 97 100 114
Liberia 110 106 119 109 94
Mongolia 111 99 138 89 145
Nigeria 112 80 85 83 81
Rest America Nes 113 137 132 128 141
Togo 114 111 90 143 143
Kuwait 115 126 136 119 115
Myanmar (Burma) 116 102 114 115 119
Sudan 117 120 115 126 138
Qatar 118 115 137 121 136
Zambia 119 101 123 131 121
Senegal 120 117 99 113 129
Mozambique 121 97 94 85 95
Syrn Arab Rp 122 124 110 103 68
Burkina Faso 123 134 101 144 134
Benin 124 96 87 147 122
Saudi Arabia 125 118 106 55 84
Jordan 126 140 134 75 113
Iran 127 133 118 76 51
Bermuda 128 127 130 96 93
Kiribati 129 128 120 80 127
Surinam 130 119 112 90 108
Papua N.Guinea 131 110 107 129 105
Uganda 132 104 96 138 116
New Caledonia 133 135 128 93 101
Gabon 134 123 125 77 125
Central Afr. Rep. 135 113 100 142 147
Greenland 136 139 144 127 91
Mali 137 130 124 98 118
French Guiana 138 138 141 122 132
Rwanda 139 132 127 145 139
Liby Arab Jm 140 129 145 125 100
Laos P.Dem.R 141 149 149 130 107
Mauritania 142 146 150 141 130
Guadeloupe 143 152 140 104 87
Vietnam 144 143 139 137 85
Gibraltar 145 155 147 79 60
St.Helena 146 150 148 134 126
Fm Dem Yemen 147 148 142 81 79
Fm Yemen 148 147 143 132 137
Gambia 149 154 146 140 146
Niger 150 151 131 58 112Table 5 - Pairwise rank correlations of country rankings
TS7 TS7 SITC Feenstra-Rose Feenstra-Rose





SITC 5 digit 0.9032 0.913 1
(0.0000) (0.0000)
Goods Based 0.7568 0.7391 0.8272 1
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Country Based 0.766 0.7341 0.8404 0.9089 1
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
*p-values are reported in parentheses below the correlations